In this paper, we address the problem of bandwidth sharing among multiple primary users and multiple secondary users in a cognitive radio network. In cognitive radio networks, effective spectrum assignment for primary and secondary users is a challenge due to the available broad range of radio frequency spectrum as well as the requisition of harmonious coexistence of both users. To handle this problem, firstly, Bertrand game model is used to analyze a spectrum pricing in which multiple primary users emulate with each other to acquire maximal profit. After that, we employ Cournot game to model the spectrum sharing of secondary users to obtain optimal profit for each user also. Simulation results show that our scheme obtains optimal solution at Nash equilibrium.
maximizing throughput and channel utilization [3] .
In [4] , an introduction to game theory is described.
In [5] , a competitive pricing model for spectrum sharing using Bertrand game was proposed. A game theoretical adaptive channel allocation was presented in [6] . In [7] , it introduced a multi-winner spectrum auction framework, and developed suitable mechanisms for that kind of auction. Cournot game is also used to model the problem of bandwidth allocation among SUs in cognitive radio networks [8] . In [9] , a non-cooperative game-theoretic framework was proposed for radio resource management in 4G heterogeneous wireless access networks. A resource management method in wireless mesh network is provided in [10] . Using game theory, from existing works, they separated the bandwidth sharing into two cases: the spectrum allocation schemes for PUs and the spectrum allocation scheme for SUs. Regarding the spectrum allocation schemes for PUs, they focus on maximizing profit of PUs and also determined the total bandwidth can be shared to SUs, but it does not concern about spectrum sharing among SUs to get optimal profit for SUs. On the other hand, the spectrum allocation schemes for SUs assume the total shared bandwidth from PUs without concerning whether that value is optimal for PUs or not. They focus on only spectrum assignment for SUs.
Therefore, there is no significant relationship between the profit of PUs and profit of SUs which is meaningful and always required in real models.
In this paper, we address the problem of bandwidth sharing among multiple primary users and multiple secondary users in a cognitive radio network. The purpose is to optimize both the profit of PUs and SUs within a rational connection between the spectrum sharing models, thus it also enhances spectrum utilization. In order to handle this problem, we propose a mixed game theoretical approach. Firstly, Bertrand game model is used to analyze a spectrum pricing in which a few primary users offer spectrum access occasions to a secondary service. We formulate this problem as an oligopoly market in which a few firms (i.e., PUs) emulate with each other in terms of price of commodity (i.e, spectrum) provided to the market to achieve maximal profit. In this case, for a PU, the bandwidth demand of the secondary service is presented based on a spectrum demand function and the cost of spectrum sharing is defined based on quality of service (QoS) attenuation. We consider the Nash equilibrium as the solution of this game.
Obtaining that solution, we determine the aggregate spectrum sold for the secondary service.
It is also the amount of available bandwidth that can be shared to SUs. Next, we employ Cournot game to model the spectrum sharing of secondary users. Here, we also formulate this problem as an oligopoly market where a few firms (i.e., SUs) compete with each other in terms of quantity of commodity to obtain optimal profit value. For each SU, a revenue function is created by considering utility and the cost is modeled based on the loss of QoS and payment for using spectrum within a relationship with the result of the previous Bertrand game model. The Nash equilibrium is regarded as a solution of this game. We utilize the iterative algorithm to obtain the Nash equilibrium.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes the system model and assumptions. In Section 3, we present game models and formulate the problem. Simulation results are shown in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a cognitive radio network with M primary users and a secondary service serving N secondary users as shown in Figure 1 . In this case, primary user  operating on the frequency spectrum   tends to sell its unused bandwidth (e.g., time slots in TDMA or radio frequencies in FDMA) at price   (per unit of bandwidth) to the secondary Using adaptive modulation, transmission rate of users is dynamically adjusted based on the transmission channel quality. We can compute the spectral efficiency  of the transmission for users as follows [5, (1) ]. In order to guarantee QoS for users, the bit error rate (BER) must be maintained less than or equal to the target BER level (  ).
By channel evaluation, we suppose that the SNR information is available at the receiver.
3. SPECTRUM SHARING MANAGEMENT SCHEME 
Spectrum Pricing Competition Scheme for Primary Users
For each primary user , the spectrum is sold to the secondary service is the spectrum demand for frequency spectrum   at the secondary service. The spectrum demand function    of secondary service can be described from [5] The revenue of each PU includes benefits from selling a portion of its spectrum and utilization its remaining spectrum. We can formulate the benefit of utilization the remaining spectrum based on considering it is as capacity of the bandwidth.
Thus, Shannon formula is applied to do this.
Therefore, the revenue function    for primary user  is described as follows:
where   denotes the constant weights,   is the size of allocated spectrum for PU ,     is the SNR at the receiver of PU . (2) and (3).
Spectrum Sharing Scheme for Secondary Users
In order to quantify the revenue of secondary users, we employ the concept of utility to denote the revenue gained from an allocated bandwidth.
The utility function     (i.e., the revenue) of secondary user  assigned a frequency spectrum   from the secondary service is defined as follows SU2 increases, the bandwidth SU1 can offer is decreased. As a result, SU1 achieve the smaller best response value as well as the smaller profit. Figure 7 shows the best responses of both secondary users. The Nash equilibrium is located at the point that the best responses of the secondary users intersect. We also see that the Nash equilibrium is indicated at the different points under different channel qualities.
We next estimate the adaptation of the Nash equilibrium. Figure 8 and 9 show the offered spectrum and the profit of both SUs at the Nash equilibrium under different channel qualities. When the channel quality becomes better, the spectral efficiency is also gained. Therefore, in order to reduce attenuation in QoS performance, the spectrum allocated to the secondary user is decreased. As a result, the profit is lessened as well. We also observe that the channel quality of a secondary user affects the assigned spectrum size for other secondary user.
To estimate the iterative algorithm, we reveal its convergence to the optima in some cases of different channel qualities in Figure 10 . In this simulation, we choose the starting point is 100 Kbps.
By using the iterative algorithm, the optimal value converges to a certain value just in several iterations as shown in Figure 10 . We observe that the iterative algorithm may reach the optimal solution quite fast and smoothly.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we consider the problem of bandwidth sharing among multiple primary users and multiple secondary users in a cognitive radio users to obtain optimal profit value for each secondary user also. We formulate these problems as oligopoly market emulations. Nash equilibrium is regarded as a solution of each game. In the spectrum sharing among secondary users, the iterative algorithm is proposed to find the Nash equilibrium. 
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